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1. Introduction 
Certain  contributors  to  contemporary  debates  about  emergence  emphasise  the
importance of the category of organisation. More specifically, some who defend a form
of ontological emergence, including Tony Lawson as part of his distinctive perspective
in social  ontology and Bickhard and Campbell  in the interactionist  framework they
forward, set out a particular conception of organisation.1 They argue that as long as
ambiguities associated with the term are avoided then the category of organisation
underpins  a  coherent  account  of  emergent  phenomena.  Once  organisation  is  given
sufficient prominence and a particular meaning then it is shown by these authors that
a compelling account of causal and ontological irreducibility follows, and confusions
associated with the notion of downward causation resolved. Both these projects also
see  the  mode  of  organisation  characteristic  of  phenomena  at  different  levels  as
grounding the possibility of the development of relatively autonomous sciences.
1 Dewey, especially in some of his later contributions, places considerable emphasis on
the  category  of  organisation.  He  makes reference  to  organisation  in  numerous
contexts. For example, organisation is a central theme in Experience and Nature and a
particular  preoccupation  in  Chapter  VII  where  he  develops  an  emergent  theory  of
mind.  In  that  chapter  he  warns  of  the  dangers  associated  with  paying insufficient
attention  to  organisation,  suggesting  that:  “Organization  is  so  characteristic  of  the
nature of some events in their sequential linkages that no theory about it can be as
speculative or absurd as those which ignore or deny its genuine existence.” (Dewey
1925:  255).  Earlier in the book he had linked the inadequacies of  nominalism to its
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failure to sufficiently recognise organisation:  “Nominalism ignores organization and
thus makes nonsense of meanings.” (Ibid.:  185). He is also concerned in the book to
explore how life and mentality can be understood as reflecting different conditions of
organisation. The category of organisation features prominently elsewhere in his later
writings,  in  The  Public  and  its  Problems it  is  central  to  his  understanding  of  the
community.  He  writes:  “a  community  as  a  whole involves  not  merely  a  variety  of
associative ties which hold persons together in diverse ways, but an organization of all
elements by an integrated principle.” (Dewey 1927: 38; italics in original). Given the
emphasis that Dewey places on the category of organisation in his later writings it is
worthwhile considering both what he means by the term and why he sees paying it
sufficient attention as necessary if  certain common errors in philosophy and social
theory are to be avoided.
2 In order to explore the meaning and significance that Dewey attaches to the category of
organisation I  draw a  comparison between Dewey’s  treatment  of  organisation (and
related categories such as structure and association) in some of his later writings and
the use of the term in strands of the contemporary debates on emergence. Initially I
argue  that  a  common  understanding  of  organisation  and  its  importance  can  be
discerned  in  both  Tony  Lawson’s  work  on  social ontology  and  in  the  interactivist
perspective  developed by  Bickhard  and his  colleagues.  Even though in  essence  the
conception of organisation is the same in these two contemporary projects it is useful
to consider both of these lines of recent research since the clarifications offered and
illustrations deployed are rather different. By reviewing the relevant aspects of both
these  projects  a  fuller  appreciation  of  their  shared  account  of  organisation  is
facilitated.  I  then show how this  conception of  organisation provides a useful  basis
from which to interrogate Dewey’s earlier emphasis on organisation. The meaning and
significance attached to the category of organisation in these contemporary projects
provides  a  fresh  perspective  from  which  to  consider  Dewey’s  own  concern  with
organisation and related terms.  It  is  shown that  in  some of  his  later  contributions
Dewey anticipates important aspects of this more recent treatment of organisation.
 
2. Organisation, Reductionism and Downward
Causation
3 The category of relational organisation is central to the ontological framework that
Tony Lawson has recently developed and his  view of  how to account for  emergent
phenomena. As Lawson notes: “the components of emergent entities (unlike members
of aggregate collections) do what they do qua components only because of the manner
in which they are organised (arranged, structured or related) as parts of the whole.”
(Lawson 2012: 351). Significantly Lawson emphasises that if we retain the customary
terminology  used  in  discussions  of  emergence  of  higher  and  lower  levels  then
relational organisation needs to be both distinguished from the higher level emergent
totality, whole or system and recognised as itself being a higher rather than lower level
feature if emergence (understood as the appearance of novelty)2 is to be adequately
accounted for.
4 The totality is that which is organised, it is a concrete entity that has the relational
organisation  and  this  organisation  may  be  shared  with  other  such  entities.  New
totalities are constituted by the new higher level relational organisation that constrain
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the degree of  freedom of  their  lower level  components.  Lawson argues  that  as  the
totality emerges so too does the relational organisation, without the latter there is no
emergent totality merely a disorganised heap. He writes: “My contention is simply that
the organisation of  the lower level  phenomena is  itself  always a novel  phenomena,
emerging  along  with  any  higher  level  totality.  In  other  words  the  relational-
organisation itself must be regarded as a higher (not lower) level feature, and indeed a
causal property of the emergent totality or entity.” (Lawson 2012: 351-2).
5 Where discussions of emergence often go wrong, Lawson argues, is precisely in failing
to pay enough attention to the category of relational organisation or in understanding
it in only highly partial lower level terms. He notes: “relational-organisation, which
entails  an  arrangement  of  lower  level  elements,  is  very  often  left  largely  under
elaborated or  little  discussed,  and treated implicitly  as  part  of  the  lower  level  and
mostly as a given.” (Ibid.: 351). Relational organisation rather than being understood as
a constitutive constraint is too often, he suggests, treated as trivial non-constitutive
properties of some set of more basic ultimately unorganised lower level components.
6 The  interactivist  framework  developed  by  Bickhard  and  his  associates  is  another
ambitious ontological perspective where the category of organisation is understood as
being  central  and  indispensable  if  issues  related  to  emergence  are  to  be  clarified
adequately. For interactivists constituting organisation is seen as a locus of causal power
and more than simply the stage setting for more basic causal actors: “Emergence is
supposed to occur with new patterns of organisation. Clearly something new comes
into existence: the pattern itself. But in order for emergence to have any metaphysical
significance, something new that has its own causal efficacy some manner in which
that  which  is  new  has  consequences  for  the  future  of  the  world  must  come  into
existence.”  (Bickhard  2010:  210).  Just  as  Lawson makes  a  clear  distinction  between
totalities  and  the  relational  organisation  which  give  the  former  their  distinctive
properties and argues that both are higher level features, interactivists also insist that
complex systems and the constituting organisations in virtue of which the former have
their typical characteristics and modes of operation must be distinguished from one
another and each acknowledged as higher level phenomena. Thus Richard Campbell
suggests that the constituting organisation of a complex system captures “the way its
constituent processes are constrained and regulated over time such that the integrity
of the total system remains relatively stable and in virtue of which it has its typical
characteristics and typically operates” (Campbell 2011: 65). 
7 Interactivists argue the structural relations which configure constituents into a stable
object  belong  to  the  whole  object  and  they  highlight  that  such  configurations  are
macro-properties and not on the same level as the subsystems thus configured and
therefore upper level features every bit as much as the complex total system. Campbell
writes “The organization of any complex system is a macro-property of that system,
constituted  by  the  relations  which  configure  its  subsystems  into  specific  dynamic
patterns” (Campbell  2015:  261).  Interactivists argue that it  is  a mistake to interpret
organisation as a lower level property: “Since the structural relations which configure
lower-level entities and activities into a whole system belong to the system as a whole,
they are not on the same level as the properties of what is thus configured.” (Ibid.: 220).
For interactivists an adequate account of emergent phenomena can only be developed
once organisation is recognised as a higher level feature “it is how […] constituents are
organized which generates the novel, higher level properties – and that organization is
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a holistic, macro level feature, not a property of its constituents. And the properties it
generates are indeed emergent.” (Ibid).
8 For Lawson and the interactivists a certain form of causal pluralism accompanies their
emphasis  on  distinguishing  the  relational  (or  constituting)  organisation  from  the
structured totality and acknowledgment of their simultaneous emergence. There are
entities at both the higher and lower levels and these entities possess distinct sets of
efficient causal powers but as the entity at the higher level emerges so too does its
relational organisation and this is also causal but in a different way. Lawson illustrates
using the example of a house under construction: 
The components include bricks, mortar, wood, panes of glass, cement, etc. Of course
there will be a context, a plot of land, and this will be prepared so that the various
components can relate to it in an appropriate manner. At any stage in the process
of construction an observer will find not only the part of the building constructed
so far, formed out of various components, but also the relational organisation of the
latter components (to each other, and to elements in their environment). And this
organisation will  be essential to the house’s construction and properties.  As the
house is completed, so is the relational organisation of the house’s components; the
two – the totality and the organisational structure – emerge simultaneously. Each
are causal, but in different ways. The house has the power to provide safety and
shelter, to facilitate family or other indoor activities, to be bought and sold and so
on. The arrangement of the parts makes the house feasible. The latter is a form of
formal causation. (Lawson 2013: 64)
9 In similar fashion interactivists emphasise the need to avoid the error of collapsing all
forms  of  causality  onto  efficient  causality.  Constitutive  organisation  is  specifically
associated  with  a  version  of  formal  causality.  Richard  Campbell  notes  that  “those
properties  which  are  dependent  upon  the  mode  of  organization  of  a  system’s
constituent parts are not the same as the properties of those parts. Different sets of
similar  constituents  can  manifest  over  time  the  same  dynamic  constituting
organization in this sense, and generate the same kinds of properties and powers. If we
think of the difference between kinds of entities as arising from their having relatively
stable, cohesive but different forms of organisation, constituting organization proves to
be the contemporary and temporalized analogue of an Aristotelian form.” (Campbell
2011: 66).
10 Lawson  and  the  interactivists  recognise  that  proponents  of  ontological  and  causal
reductionism often seek to ground their position by identifying some ultimate or basic
entities  that  themselves  are  viewed  as  lacking  organising  structure.  Once  such a
foundational  level  is  posited  then  all  higher  level  entities  can  be  seen  as  being
composed from these basic building blocks and then often only causation at this level
of elementary and simple entities is seen as being of real or proper scientific concern.
Both  Lawson  and  the  interactivists  argue  that  once  organisation  is  sufficiently
recognised then these forms of reductionism can be easily resisted. Lawson notes that
even were it possible to identify any such unstructured, basic entities this would not
yet shore up claims of ontological and causal reducibility since the emergence of any
higher-level  causal  properties  would  still  depend  upon  how  the  lower  level
(fundamental)  elements were organised, i.e.,  relational organisation would still  be a
formal causal factor.  Thus, even with these assumptions any higher-level causation,
being  a  real  property  of  emergent  forms of  organisation,  would  like  the  relational
structure from which it  derives,  be synchronically irreducible and so warranting of
Dewey on Organisation
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019
4
scientific investigation at its own level despite the supposedly fundamental nature of
the elements so organised. 
11 Lawson goes on to suggest that the best available interpretations of modern physics
provide no support for the idea that there are any simple, unstructured, basic entities
that might constitute some such foundational level. He writes: “according to quantum
field theory,  or at  least  its  seemingly more explanatory powerful  interpretations,  if
there is anything that underpins everything else it is quantum field processes and the
phenomena that appear to be particles are the resulting effects of the quantisation of
field excitatory activity.  The particle-like elements are in fact  said to be ‘quanta of
excitation or field quanta.’ As such they are effectively emergent forms of organisation
displaying particle like behaviour.” (Lawson 2012: 356). For Lawson an implication of
this kind of interpretation is that any reductionist style privileging of one particular
level of organisation over all others is unjustified since “although there are, or can be,
relations of dependency between organisations at different levels,  there need be no
ultimate or base level in quantum field theory, and so no reason for asserting that any
one pattern or organisation of process is more fundamental, elementary, genuine, real
or basic than any other; all remain of potential interest to science” (ibid.: 356).
12 Interactivists also emphasise that even where properties of the higher level system may
be accounted for in aggregative terms organisation nonetheless remains fundamental.
Campbell writes that where:
“cohesive systems” (i.e., entities) are formed, in many cases one can speak of their
having  components  as  their  proper  parts.  Typically  such  entities  manifest
properties different from those of their parts. With respect to certain properties,
this difference is merely one of quantity; the whole has at least some properties of
the same kind as its proper parts. Such properties do result from an aggregation of
the properties of their components […] In such cases, the properties of the whole
can be explained by an exhaustive and exclusive decomposition of the system into
its proper parts. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, even in cases like this,
more is involved in being a cohesive and causally effective aggregate than simply
the  arithmetical  sum  (that  is,  a  bare  conjunction)  of  its  components.  Those
components  have to  stick together,  somehow or  other,  in  order  to  constitute  a
cohesive  entity  –  and  sticking  together  requires  internal  bonds  between  the
components. (Campbell 2015: 204)
13 Interactivists also draw on interpretations of modern physics to suggest that ultimately
it  seems  unlikely  that  there  are  any  basic  particulars  which  themselves  lack
organisation and form the fundamental constituents out of which everything in the
world is composed. According to Campbell and Bickhard:
From the beginning of the twentieth century, physics has been dogged by a series of
deep  theoretical  inconsistencies  that  are  not  yet  fully  resolved.  But  enough
theoretical  progress  has  been  made  for  some  conclusions  of  metaphysical
significance to be drawn. What our best contemporary physics reveals is that there
are no elementary particles, elemental events, or some such particulars; everything
is  composed of  quantum fields  of  various  scales  and complexity.  Quantum field
theory shifts the basic ontology of the universe from micro-particles to quantum
fields  in  process.  What  have  seemed  to  be  particles  are  now conceptualised  as
particle-like  processes  and  interactions  resulting  from the  quantization  of  field
processes and interactions. (Campbell & Bickhard 2011: 45)
14 From  the  kind  of  perspective  developed  by  Bickhard  et  al,  the  world  consists  of
organised fields of process all the way down and all the way up, there is no privileged
base level. Campbell writes:
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The  development  of  physics  since  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  has
provided explanations of how quantum fields are organized in various ways so as to
yield the different kinds of elements ordered in the periodic table. And chemical
theory has explained how those various atoms combine to produce even richer
variety of kinds of molecule. It follows that the world is composed of organized
fields in process – all the way down and all the way up. Everything there is has now
to be understood as emerging from organizations of energy. (Campbell 2015: 70)
15 Discussions of emergence are often bound up with the notion of downward causation.
Lawson  is  critical  of  how  many  of  these  discussions  of  downward  causation  are
formulated viewing them as often being thoroughly confused (Lawson 2012: 352). He
worries  that  the  notion  of  downward  causation  often  ends  up  encouraging  the
acceptance of  a  picture  that  disguises  the  importance of  relational  organisation by
depicting two levels of entities moving as it were in parallel, with entities at the lower
level causally acting upwards and wholes or totalities at the higher level also having
efficient  causal  impacts  on  their  parts.  As  noted  above  Lawson  argues  that  it  is
important to carefully distinguish between any emergent system or totality and the
organisational relational structure of the system’s components. While these two – the
totality and the relational organisation – emerge simultaneously they are not identical,
they make a difference in distinct ways. He states that when adopting a diachronic (as
opposed  to  a  synchronic)  criterion  for  distinguishing  levels  both  the  organising
structure and the totality lie at the higher level. There are social systems or totalities
with their own efficient causal powers. However, the organising relations also make a
difference,  they  do  so  through  a  type  of  formal  causation  influencing  how  the
components interact. The totality is then the sum of its constituent components and
the  organising  relational  structure  and  causally  acts  through  rather  than  on  its
components. Lawson notes:
Wholes  act  through their  parts  acting  and  their  parts  are  coordinated  in  their
actions through the emergent irreducible relational structures that organise the
lower level elements as (perhaps through modification) components of emergent
wholes […]. Thus, an army attacks through the actions of its soldiers (or guided
weapons);  a  school educates through the interactions of  its  members;  a  football
team scores through a player scoring. Parts of a whole though interact with, and
relate directly to, not a whole but each other and the organising structure. (Lawson 
2015: 6)
16 Lawson further illustrates by referring to the familiar example of a crowd. The crowd
certainly  emerges  through  individuals  interacting  in  a  context  and  this  emergent
totality  has powers of  efficient  causality  so,  for  example,  traffic  may be delayed as
walking on the relevant roads takes precedence over driving.  Crucially  though,  the
individuals in their interactions draw not on the crowd behaviour as a totality but on
the  relational  structure  that  organises  individuals  as  components  of  the  latter.  So
Lawson notes: 
With any crowd a somewhat novel organising relational structure emerges (and is
continually reproduced and/or transformed). Individuals are obliged to walk in a
given direction, to seek to avoid colliding with others, and so move at an emergent
speed.  Also rights of  interaction can emerge that,  in different contexts,  are not
typically  readily  open  to  relative  strangers  […] But  always  the  organisational
structure that emerges will be formed out of pre-existing context specific collective
practices, including the rights and obligations they carry. (Lawson 2013: 71)
17 For Lawson if downward causation is used to express the idea that an entity or whole
(synchronically) causally impacts upon its parts then the notion is simply untenable. A
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whole cannot act in this manner since the whole is composed out of the latter. Much of
the discussion of downward causation is problematic, according to Lawson, because it
fails  to  consistently draw  the  distinction  between  emergent  totalities  and  the
organising structures on which they depend, an error that he speculates is encouraged
by the two distinct inflections associated with the term organisation: “In processes of
emergence the lower level elements become organised as components of the emergent
entity or whole, and so we can refer to the organisation of the components. But the
category organisation is also regularly employed to refer to the totality including the
lower level elements that have become (re)organised.” (Lawson 2012: 352).
18 Interactivists express similar concerns about the relative neglect of organisation when
they  question  the  coherence  of  conventional  talk  of  “emergent  bases”  within  the
literature on emergence.  They highlight that it  is  far from clear that the notion of
emergence  base  is  coherent  once  organisation  as  a  holistic  relational  feature  is
acknowledged. Campbell elaborates using the familiar example of water. He writes that
in the case of water:
it seems simple to specify the base from which a molecule of water emerges: it is
those atoms [of hydrogen and oxygen]. The implicit claim is that the proper parts of
a molecule of water are two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen, and nothing
else. But that is too simple; some force holds the atoms in a molecule together. A
more  sophisticated  and  informed  version  of  this  claim  would  acknowledge  the
forces  within  the  molecule,  but  give  them  a  particle  interpretation.  Thus,  the
proper parts of a molecule of water would be two atoms of hydrogen and one atom
of  oxygen,  plus  elementary  particles  whose  exchanging  holds  the  molecules
together. This, however, is still inadequate. There is more to a molecule of water
than two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom plus some elementary particles;
there is the pattern of the relationship between them, and that patterning of the
process,  its  organization,  is  what  determines  the  emergent  properties  of  water.
(Campbell 2015: 198)
19 Interactivists have tended to persevere with the term downward causation but seem
sensitive to the kinds of distinctions Lawson views as crucial if a coherent account of
emergent phenomena is to be elaborated. For example, as noted earlier, interactivists
interpret the kind of influence that constitutive organisation has as a type of formal
causality. The higher level constitutive organisation is construed as constraining the
efficient causal interactions between the system’s components by selecting among a
wide set of interactional possibilities (Bickhard & Campbell 2003). Indeed downward
causation seems to be a label used to refer to this formal influence of the constitutive
organisation with respect to its parts. 
20 For  both  Lawson  and  the  interactivists  organisation  serves  to  ground  the  relative
autonomy of  the  individual  sciences.  All  forms of  established science,  according to
Lawson, have objects of study that are effectively emergent forms of organisations and
each  science  is  especially  concerned  with  the  irreducible  causal  properties  of  the
entities that populate their respective domains of study.  So,  for example,  it  is  – he
suggests – precisely because the social realm has a distinct mode of organisation that a
relatively autonomous social science remains entirely feasible. From the interactivist
group Campbell, deploying the language of levels, writes: “we should note that each
level  is  defined  by  the  kinds  of  entity  (‘object’)  with  their  distinctive  modes  of
interaction,  which  exist  on  that  level.  The  distinctive  entities,  properties,  and
interactions which define a level constitute the domain of a particular science. That is
the  categorical  inferences  licensed  by  an  individual  science  imply  an  ontology  of
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entities  of  a  certain kind or  kinds,  possessing distinctive properties  and distinctive
modes of interaction.” (Lawson 2015: 196).3
 
3. Dewey on Organisation, Structure and Association
21 There are striking correspondences between the characterisation of (and significance
attached to) organisation in the contributions of Lawson and the interactivists and that
found in certain of Dewey’s later contributions. Dewey too highlights the need to pay
close  attention  to  the  category  of  organisation  if  prominent  types  of  error  in
philosophy as well as social theory are to be avoided. The commonalities are especially
pronounced where Dewey (writing with Sidney Hook and Ernest Nagel) responds to
criticisms  concerning  the  form  of  naturalism  and  materialism  they  are  taken  to
advocate.  In clarifying their shared position they address issues that would now be
linked to debates about reductionism and downward causation. 
22 Dewey  and  his  associates  argue  that  it  is  a  significant  mistake  to  regard  some
structured unity and its properties as in any sense being separated off from its parts
and  their  organisation  and  capable  of  directly  controlling  its  constituents  in  some
external, unmediated fashion. In elaborating upon this theme, they emphasise the need
to recognise the significance of organisation. In order to illustrate the relevant issues
they consider the example of water molecules:
For suppose a chemist were asked whether he believed that the properties of water
are at “the beck and call” of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, or whether he thought
that water “controlled” the behaviours and properties of its constituents. Would he
not  reply  that  the  questions  are  meaningful  only  on  the  assumption  that  the
properties of water are not only distinguishable from those of its constituents taken
singly or in isolation from each other, but are also substantially distinct from the
properties of hydrogen and oxygen atoms when these are related in the way in
which  water  molecules  are  organized?  On  the  other  hand,  the  chemist  would
certainly maintain that the existence of water and its properties is contingent upon
the combined presence of certain elements interrelated in definite ways. But he
would  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  when  these  elements  are  so  related,  a
distinctive mode of behaviour is exhibited by the structured unity into which they
enter.  Nevertheless,  this  structured  object  is  not  an  additional thing  which,  in
manifesting  its  properties,  controls  from  some  external  vantage  point  the
behaviour of its organized parts. The structured object in behaving the way it does
behave  under  given  circumstances  is  simply  manifesting  the  behaviour  of  its
constituents as related in that structure under those circumstances. (Dewey, Hook
& Nagel 1945: 520-1; italics in original)
23 In a manner that anticipates the concerns Lawson raises against some contemporary
accounts  of  downward  causation,  Dewey  and  his  colleagues  see  any  reification  of
structured unities and the attribution to them of the power to interact downwardly
upon their own parts as highly problematic reflecting insufficient attention being paid
to  the relevant  forms  of  relatedness  through  which  the  parts  are  organised.  The
existence of water depends on both individual components and organising relations.
The structured unity cannot directly act on its parts since it is composed out of (and
only acts through) the later. However, at any point in time the organising relations of
the structured unity can and do make a difference to how the components interact. For
Dewey and his collaborators the constituents of a sample of water do what they do as
constituents of that structured unity only because of the manner in which they are
organised (related or arranged). It is precisely when, and due to the manner in which
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the  (pre-structured)  constituents  are  so  organised  or  related  that  the  distinctive
properties associated with water become feasible. It is only then that the organised
component  parts  make  the  contribution  they  do  to  the  structured  object.  The
emergence of the structured unity and the organising structure is taken to be part of
one and the same development.4
24 In parallel fashion Dewey, Hook and Nagel regard mentality as a quality emergent from
a special organisation of physical processes, it is only the organised system of the living
body as a whole that gives rise to the sensations experienced when certain brain states
are activated.  The emphasis is  upon the need to distinguish between the organised
whole and relational organisation and on seeing the two as arising together:
The naturalist proceeds in an essentially no different manner in giving his account
of the status of minds. Like the chemist in reference to the properties of water, he
maintains  that  the  states  and  events  called  mental  exist  only  when  certain
organizations of physical things also occur. And also like the chemist, he holds that
the qualities and behaviours displayed by physical things when they are properly
organized  – the  qualities  and  behaviours  called  mental  or  spiritual  – are  not
exhibited by those  things  unless  they are  so  organized.  But  these  qualities  and
behaviours of  organised wholes are not additional things which are substantially
distinct  from the  properties  and  behaviours  of  spatio-temporal  objects  in  their
organized unity. Accordingly, naturalists most emphatically acknowledge that men
are capable  of  thought,  feeling,  and emotion,  and that  in  consequence of  these
powers  (whose existence is  contingent  upon the organization of  human bodies)
men can engage in actions that bodies not so organized are unable to perform. In
particular, human beings are capable of rational inquiry, and in the light of their
findings they are able to “redistribute” spatio-temporal things so as to ensure the
arrival and departure of many events both physical and mental. They achieve these
things, however, not as disembodied minds, but as distinctively organized bodies.
(Dewey, Hook & Nagel 1945: 521-2; italics in original)
25 Dewey, Hook and Nagel conclude the relevant section by highlighting that organisation
or  arrangement  is  always  central  to  the  constitution  of  structured  wholes  and  in
accounting for their distinctive properties regardless of whether the focus is on water,
minds or artefacts – such as clocks:
To the naturalist,  at any rate, there is no more mystery in the fact that certain
kinds of bodies are able to think and act rationally than in the fact that cogs and
springs arranged in definite ways can record the passage of time or that hydrogen
and oxygen atoms ordered in other ways display the properties of water. “Things
are what they are,  and their  consequences will  be what they will  be;  why then
should we desire to be deceived?” (Ibid.: 522)
26 In this response the terms organisation, arrangement, order and relation seem to be
used almost  interchangeably.  In  Experience  and  Nature Dewey,  at  times,  deploys  the
further term structure when considering the kind of organising relations characteristic
of  artefacts  and uses  the  example  of  a  house  to  illustrate.  Just  as  with  regard  the
category of organisation in the joint response to the critic considered above, Dewey
when elaborating on this example insists that structure is a property of the totality –
the realised construction. The totality and the organising structure emerge for Dewey
simultaneously,  they are not identical  and neither should be neglected.  On Dewey’s
account it is the organising structure that makes the house feasible – it serves as a
condition of its possibility. He argues that in recognising structure and its role it is
necessary to avoid isolating it from the totality since to do so would be to encourage a
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confused  understanding  whereby  organising  structure  is  taken  as  somehow
mysteriously existing without anything actually being organised. He writes:
A house has a structure; in comparison with the disintegration and collapse that
would occur without its presence, this structure is fixed. Yet it is not something
external to which the changes involved in building and using the house have to
submit. It is rather an arrangement of changing events such that properties which
change slowly, limit and direct a series of quick changes and give them an order
they do not otherwise possess. Structure is constancy of means, of things used for
consequences, not of things taken by themselves or absolutely. Structure is what
makes construction possible and cannot be discovered or defined except in some
realised construction, construction being, of course, an evident order of changes.
The isolation of structure from the changes whose stable ordering it is, renders it
mysterious – something that is metaphysical in the popular sense of the word, a
kind of ghostly queerness. (Dewey 1925: 72)
27 For Lawson and the interactionists the focus on organisation grounds their rejection of
causal and ontological reductionism. That is, they agree that an adequate recognition
of organisation serves to counter any notion that emergent properties, including causal
powers of emergent totalities,  depend solely on and are entirely predictable from a
knowledge of the properties of the various elements that are eventually organised as
components. Dewey too is anxious to resist such forms of reductionism. At times this is
expressed in general terms, for example, in Logic: A Theory of Inquiry he writes:
The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of logic is continuity of the lower
(less  complex)  and the higher (more complex)  activities  and forms.  The idea of
continuity is not self-explanatory. But its meaning excludes complete rupture on
the one side and mere repetition of identities on the other; it precludes reduction of
the “higher” to the “lower” just  as  it  precludes complete breaks and gaps.  The
growth and development of any living organism from seed to maturity illustrates
the meaning of continuity. (Dewey 1938: 23)
28 This kind of anti-reductionist stance encourages Dewey to take up the more concrete
challenge  of  advancing  powerful  accounts  of  phenomena  or  systems  that  exist  at
various levels. In doing so, organisation is central to the discussion. His accounts of
both  life  and  mind  in  Experience  and  Nature are  explicitly  framed  in terms  of
organisation. The category of organisation is important for Dewey’s attempt to account
for how such phenomena,  while  being fully  integrated with the rest  of  the natural
world,  can  still  be  meaningfully  distinguished.  It  is  in  terms  of  their  respective
conditions of organisation and corresponding modes of interaction that he seeks to
differentiate them from other types of phenomena and from one another. For Dewey
“while there is no isolated occurrence in nature, yet interaction and connection are not
wholesale and homogenous” (1925: 271). He writes:
As life is a character of events in a peculiar condition of organization, and feeling is
a quality of life-forms marked by complexly mobile and discriminating responses,
so “mind” is an added property assumed by a feeling creature, when it reaches that
organized  interaction  with  other  living  creatures  which  is  language
communication. (Ibid.: 258)
29 Fundamental to understanding the characteristic features of a domain is consideration
of  the  relevant  conditions  of  organisation.  Life  is  understood  by  Dewey  as  being
constituted by a complex organisation of natural sub processes (or events) and mind by
an organisation of physiological processes: 
Unless  vital  organizations  were  organizations  of  antecedent  natural  events,  the
living creature would have no natural connections; it would not be pertinent to its
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environment nor its environment relevant to it;  the latter would not be usable,
material  of  nutrition  and defence.  In  similar  fashion,  unless  “mind” was,  in  its
existential occurrence, an organization of physiological or vital affairs and unless
its  functions  developed out  of  patterns  of  organic  behaviour,  it  would  have  no
pertinency  to  nature,  and  nature  would  not  be  the  appropriate  scene  of  its
inventions and plans, nor the subject matter of its knowledge. (Ibid.: 286)
30 Dewey  opens  the  chapter  in  Experience  and  Nature concerned  with  mind  with  the
observation  that:  “Personality,  selfhood,  subjectivity  are  eventful  functions  that
emerge with complexly organized interactions, organic and social.” (Ibid.: 208).
31 In Experience and Nature Dewey is not satisfied with simply noting how organisation is
central  to  differentiating  types  of  phenomena  but  also  explores,  in  an  empirically
informed manner, the conditions of organisation and modes of interaction distinctive
of  living  organisms.  In  considering  what  distinguishes  the  living  body  from  the
inanimate he focuses in on that specific form of organisation in which the interactions
are regulated in such a way as to maintain the system in being as an integral whole
despite variations in external conditions: 
The interactions of the various constituent parts of a plant take place in such ways
as to tend to continue a characteristically organized activity; they tend to utilize
conserved consequences of past activities so as to adapt subsequent changes to the
needs of the integral system to which they belong. Organization is a fact, though it
is not an original organizing force. Iron as such exhibits characteristics of bias and
selective reactions, but it shows no bias in favour of remaining simple iron; it had
just as soon, so to speak, become iron-oxide. It shows no tendency in its interaction
with  water  to  modify  the  interaction  so  that  consequences  will  perpetuate  the
characteristics of pure iron. If it did it would have the marks of a living body, and
would be called an organism. (Ibid.: 254)
32 Both with regard the mind and the distinctively social Dewey is similarly concerned to
give further content to the specific condition of organisation he sees as distinguishing
these phenomena. For Dewey it is important to recognise that we are both embodied
and yet emergent always in essential interaction with our environments and cultures.
He writes:
“body-mind” simply designates  what  actually  takes  place  when a  living body is
implicated  in  situations  of  discourse,  communication  and  participation.  In  the
hyphenated phrase body-mind, body designates the continued and conserved, the
registered and cumulative operation of factors continuous with the rest of nature,
inanimate  as  well  as  animate;  while  “mind” designates  the  characters  and
consequences which are differential, indicative of gestures which emerge when “
body” is engaged in wider more complex and interdependent situation. (Ibid.: 285)
33 The  properties  of  mind  on  Dewey’s  account  are  grounded  in,  emergent  from  but
irreducible to the living body.
34 When focussing in on the specifically human realm and how to distinguish it Dewey
sometimes deploys the term association rather than organisation but it seems to serve a
similar function. He writes:
Everything that exists in as far as it is known and knowable is in interaction with
other things. It is associated, as well as solitary, single. The catching up of human
individuals  into  association  is  thus  no  new  and  unprecedented  fact;  it  is  a
manifestation of a commonplace of existence. Significance resides not in the bare
fact of association, therefore, but in the consequences that flow from the distinctive
patterns of human association. There is again nothing new or unprecedented in the
fact that assemblage of things confers upon the assembly and its constituents, new
properties  by  means  of  unlocking  energies  hitherto  pent  in.  The  significant
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consideration is that assemblage of organic human beings transforms sequence and
coexistence into participation. (Ibid.: 175)
35 When  the  focus  is  on  life  and  mentality  Dewey’s  concern  is  with  specifying  the
conditions of organisation characteristic of these phenomena, when his attention turns
to the social he is interested in specifying the distinctive patterns of association that
distinguish human sociality. 
36 This theme of the distinctive characteristics of the social are taken up in Dewey’s paper
“Social as a Category” of 1928, where once again the notion of association is prominent.
He writes:
If reference to association is to be anything more than a ceremonial and barren act
of deference, if  it  is to be used in any enterprise of philosophic description and
understanding,  it  indicates  the  necessity  of  study  and  analysis  of  the  different
modes of association that present themselves in experience. And the implication of
our  argument  is  that  in  such a  comparison of  definite  types  of  association the
social, in its human sense, is the richest, fullest and most delicately subtle of any
mode actually experienced […]. Association in general is but a matrix; its filling are
the  facts  of  association  actually  displayed  in  nature.  Indeed,  the  category  of
association  is  but  a  highly  abstract  notion  of  what  is  formally  common  to  the
special modes. (Dewey 1928: 165)
37 According to Dewey social groups, such as the family, manifest properties and powers
which are novel and distinctive:
[I]n the social the physical is taken up into a wider and more complex and delicate
system of interactions so they take on new properties by release of potentialities
previously confined because of absence of full interaction. The same consideration
applies to the inclusion within the social of the vital or organic. The members of
society are living beings with the characteristics of living creatures; but as these
enter  into  distinctly  human  associations  their  strictly  organic  properties  are
modified and even transformed. Certain physiological factors of sex, of procreation,
immaturity and need of care, are assuredly implicated in the functions expressed in
family life. But however great the role of animal lust, there is something more in
any family association than bare physiological factors. (Ibid.: 169-70)
38 For Dewey certain powers of coordinated interactions are available to individuals qua
members of human communities that would not have emerged if human individuals
were instead mere biological beings that just happened to be situated in close space-
time  proximity.  He  insists  that  reductionist  and  supernatural  interpretations  of
distinctively social phenomena can be avoided since given his general framework there
is an obvious empirically compelling alternative understanding available: 
The fact of transformation of the purely organic by inclusion within the scope of
human association is so obvious – note the significant change of cries into speech –
that  it  has  indeed  led  to  belief  in  the  intrusive  intervention  of  unnatural  and
supernatural factors in order to account for the differences between the animal and
the human. The disjunction between the assertion that the human is merely animal
and the assertion that an extraneous force is obtruded is not however exhaustive.
There  remains  an  alternative  which  is  most  fully  confirmed  by  empirical  fact,
namely that the difference is made when new potentialities are actualised, when
the range of interactions that delimits the notion of the organic is taken into the
wider and more subtly complex association which forms human society. (Ibid.: 170)
39 In elaborating upon his account of that form of association that is distinctively human
Dewey in The Public and its Problems places particular emphasis upon the rights, duties
and responsibilities that individuals acquire as they enter into different associations.
His initial example is that of marriage. 
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A single man when he is joined in marriage is different in that connection to what
he was as single or to what he is in some other union, as a member, say, of a club.
He has new powers and immunities, new responsibilities. He can be contrasted with
himself as he behaves in other connections. He may be compared and contrasted
with his wife in their distinctive roles within the union. But as a member of the
union he cannot be treated as antithetical to the union in which he belongs. As a
member of the union, his traits and acts are evidently those which he possesses in
virtue of it, while those of the integrated association are what they are in virtue of
his status in the union. The only reason we fail to see this, or are confused by the
statement of it, is because we pass so easily from the man in one connection to the
man in some other connection, to the man not as husband but as business man,
scientific investigator, church member or citizen, in which connections his acts and
their  consequences  are  obviously  different  to  those  due  to  union  in  wedlock.
(Dewey 1927: 189)
40 For  Dewey  individuals  behave  differently  depending  on  the  kind  of  integrated
association they become enrolled into as in each case they will be faced with specific
sets of rights and duties. He develops his theme by considering as a further illustration
the modern corporation. The corporation is seen by Dewey as manifesting properties
and powers which are novel and distinctive,  not manifested by the singular human
members  who  in  part  constitute  it.  Individuals  within  the  corporation  are  given
distinct statuses and the corporation itself is seen as acquiring certain rights. He writes:
A corporation as such is an integrated collective mode of action having powers,
rights, duties and immunities different from those of its singular members in their
other connections. Its different constituents have also diverse statuses – for example,
the owners of stock from the officers and directors in certain matters. (Dewey 1927:
190; italics in original)
41 Dewey  in  considering  the  case  of  the  corporation  restates  his  worries  about  the
common tendency, as he sees it,  to reify structured unities now exploring how this
manifests itself at the level of social ontology. Dewey is keen to emphasise that the
corporation  as  an  integrated  association  only  acts  through  its  components.  The
individuals who are parts of the corporation interact not with corporate behaviour as a
totality but are faced with specific sets of rights and obligations and act on the basis of
these  and  thereby  contribute  as  an  element  in  this  specific  form  of  integrated
association: 
Since the corporation can do things which its individual members, in their many
relationships outside of their connections in the corporation, cannot do, the problem is
raised as to the relation of the corporate collective union to that of individuals as
such. It is forgotten that as members of the corporation the individuals themselves
are  different,  have  different  characteristics,  rights  and duties,  than they  would
possess if they were not its members and different from those which they possess in
other forms of conjoint behaviour. But what the individuals may do legitimately as
members of the corporation in their respective corporate roles,  the corporation
does and vice versa… An individual cannot be opposed to the association of which
he is an integral part nor can the association be set against its integral members.
(Ibid.: 188-9)5
42 Dewey also draws on the corporation when seeking to illustrate the validity of and need
for  relatively  autonomous  social  science  research.  Thus,  in  Experience  and  Nature
corporations are understood as being entirely dependent on the interactions of human
beings and yet an irreducible objective reality deserving scientific investigation every
bit as much as electrons are. He writes: 
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What is a Corporation, a Franchise? A corporation is neither a mental state nor a
particular physical event in space and time. Yet it is an objective reality, not an
ideal Realm of being. It is an objective reality which has multitudinous physical and
mental consequence. It is something to be studied as we study electrons; it exhibits
as does the latter unexpected properties, and when introduced into new situations
behaves with new reactions. It is something which may be conducted, facilitated
and obstructed, precisely as may be a river. Nevertheless, it would not exist nor
have any meaning and potency apart from an interaction of human beings with one
another, an interaction in which external things are implicated. (Dewey 1925: 197)
43 The implication here seems to be that the corporation is a system that has distinctive
properties and is part of a social reality that has emerged (and continues to emerge)
from  non-social  phenomena  which  constitutes  a  relatively  distinct  order  requiring
separate scientific study.6 Thus, like Lawson and the interactivists, Dewey maintains
that at the level of the social there are real irreducible system features that constitute
objects of knowledge and that will often only be understood through lengthy processes
of scientific investigation. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
44 The category of  organisation is  central  to  the way that  two contemporary projects
account for emergent phenomena. Both Lawson’s project in social ontology and the
interactivist framework Bickhard and his collaborators develop highlight organisation
as a fundamental category that once sufficiently elaborated serves to counter causal
and ontological  reductionism and resolve ambiguities  associated with the notion of
downward causation. Moreover, within these projects different modes of organisation
ground the possibility of the development of relatively autonomous sciences.
45 Organisation, alongside related categories such as structure and association, feature
prominently in certain of Dewey’s later contributions. The emphasis on organisation in
Dewey’s  later  works  anticipates  the  prominence  the  category  receives  in  the  two
contemporary projects considered. In Experience and Nature and some other later works
Dewey emphasises the need to recognise organisation so as to fend off reductionism
and highlight the dangers of reifying structured unities and seeing them as capable of
directly acting on their components/parts. Furthermore, Dewey defends the possibility
of  a  scientific  engagement  with  distinctively  social  phenomena.  The  pattern  of
association characterising social phenomena mean they are irreducible to lower level
phenomena – he views corporations for example as being just as real as electrons and
equally legitimate candidates for scientific investigation. 
46 Insight regarding the significance Dewey attaches to organisation, and closely aligned
categories such as structure and association, in some of his later contributions can be
obtained by considering his relevant writings alongside the treatment of organisation
found  in  modern  projects  that  seek  to  systematically  theorise  organisation.  The
account of organisation and the importance attached to it in the two contemporary
projects is anticipated to a significant extent by Dewey in some of his later writings.
Despite the interesting correspondences and overlaps between the two contemporary
projects considered and aspects of Dewey’s later work there is no claim that these three
projects  are in any sense identical.  While  it  can be shown that  they share a  broad
emphasis on organisation and it  serves a similar role in precluding ontological  and
causal  reductionism,  this  does  not  mean  that  they  characterise  the  modes  of
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organisation  operative  at  distinct  levels  in  the  same  manner.  Tracing  out  the
similarities and differences in the characterisation of different modes or conditions of
organisation would constitute a further project.7
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NOTES
1. For discussion of key elements of the interactivist framework, a project initially located in the
field of theoretical psychology, see Bickhard 2009, 2010 and 2018. Lawson 2019, Pratten 2015, and
Faulkner, Pratten and Runde 2017 provide context regarding Lawson’s contributions to social
ontology. Lawson has long been located in the Economics Faculty at Cambridge University, his
focus on social ontology was encouraged by a growing appreciation that the current disarray and
explanatory  failure  of  the  economics  discipline  could  only  be  accounted  for  by  adopting  an
explicitly ontological orientation (see Lawson 1997). As he has elaborated his ontological project
he has engaged with others promoting the study of social ontology – for a detailed comparison of
Lawson’s perspective with that advanced by John Searle, see Lawson 2016a. 
2. It is important to note that for Lawson emergence refers just to the appearance of novelty, it
marks the spot where something new arises out of what already existed. Emergence is not itself
seen by Lawson as doing any explanatory work. Thus, in an exchange with John Searle he writes:
“I  use  the  term  emergence  primarily  to  capture  any  processes  whereby  some  pre-existing
elements become organised into a totality or system, a system that is novel or unprecedented in
relation to those elements and their context. In addition, I use the term emergent in reference to
the totality itself, its causal properties, and the organisation of the elements. I do also express
these developments by saying such novel features somehow emerge. However, the manner in
which they do so  is  always  a  matter  of  investigation.  None of  the  terms are  interpreted  as
explanatory.” (Lawson 2016b: 429).
3. For  a  broader  comparison  of  Lawson’s  project  in  social  ontology  and  the  programme  of
research pursued by the interactivists, see Pratten 2013.
4. This example of water already appears in Dewey’s The Public and its Problems where it serves the
same purpose of highlighting the problem of treating the whole as an isolated entity capable of
acting on its own parts. For Dewey it is important, whether considering social or natural systems,
to recognise that the structured unity only ever acts through its parts as related or organised in a
distinctive manner. He writes: “it is absurd to suppose that a society does away with the traits of
its own constituents so that it can be set over against them. It can only be set over against the
traits which they and their like present in some other combination. A molecule of oxygen in
water may act in certain respects differently than it would in some other chemical union. But as
a  constituent  of  water  it  acts  as  water  does  as  long as  water  is  water.  The  only  intelligible
distinction which can be drawn is between the behaviours of oxygen in its different relations,
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and between those of water in its relations to various conditions, not between that of water and
the oxygen which is conjoined with hydrogen in water.” (Dewey 1927: 188-9).
5. The emphasis on the whole acting through its parts rather than directly upon its parts was
already noted earlier in the same book: “Individual human beings may lose their identity in a
mob or in a political convention or in a joint-stock corporation or at the polls. But this does not
mean that some mysterious collective agency is making decisions, but that some few persons
who know what they are about are taking advantage of massed force to conduct the mob their
way, boss a political machine, and manage the affairs of corporate business. When the public or
state  is  involved  in  making  social  arrangements  like  passing  laws,  enforcing  a  contract,
conferring a franchise, it still acts through concrete persons.” (Dewey 1927: 18).
6. The example of the corporation is indicative of Dewey’s broader commitment that there are
emergent structured unities that can become the focus for a series of relatively autonomous
sciences. Dewey indicates this kind of view where he quotes Meyer with approval: “We recognise
that throughout nature we have to face the general principle of unit-formation, and the fact that
new units need not be a mere sum of the component parts, but can be an actually new entity not
wholly predictable from component parts and known only through actual experience with the
specific product.” (Dewey 1925: 145). The recognition of the reality and causal relevance of a
series hierarchically arranged complex systems and processes implies the existence of a number
of orders of nature. For one contemporary attempt to distinguish between such emergent orders,
which itself is informed by the work of Dewey and other pragmatists, see Cahoone 2013, where
five orders of nature are examined – described as the physical, material, biological, mental and
cultural.
7. A comparison of Lawson’s account of the nature of social reality and Dewey’s commitments at
the level of social ontology would likely be especially valuable. Testa (2017) argues that Dewey’s
social ontology has certain strengths over that defended by John Searle. Lawson in a number of
critical exchanges with Searle argues that the, ultimately, ideational social ontology that he takes
Searle to be advancing fails to sufficiently recognise a practical dimension underpinning social
interactions  (see  Lawson 2016a).  An  important  theme to  explore  in  any  such  comparison  is
whether, and in what sense, Dewey acknowledges such a practical dimension. The comparison
could extend to an evaluation of how each project draws out the implications of their ontological
positions  for  an  understanding  of  social  change,  for  Lawson’s  views  on  the  possibilities  for
emancipatory social change see 2019, chapter 8 and for Dewey’s interactionist social ontology of
democracy, see Frega, 2019, chapter 4.
ABSTRACTS
In  some  of  his  later  contributions  Dewey  places  particular  emphasis  on  the  category  of
organisation. Organisation features prominently both in his later metaphysical writings and in
some of his more substantively focussed contributions. Organisation is also a central category for
two contemporary ontological projects,  namely Tony Lawson’s perspective on social ontology
and the interactivist  framework developed by Mark Bickhard and his  collaborators.  In  these
modern naturalist perspectives, the thorough theorisation of organisation is seen as crucial in
accounting  for  emergent  phenomena,  resisting  ontological  and  causal  reductionism  and
resolving ambiguities associated with certain formulations of downward causality. This paper
compares  Dewey’s  remarks  on  organisation  in  his  later  writings  with  these  contemporary
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treatments of organisation and argues that Dewey anticipates some of the insights that have
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